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INTRODUCTION 
 
There are numerous examples within private law where a third party can be held liable for 
playing a role in another person’s breach of duty. This can be relevant in claims such as 
‘dishonest assistance’ and ‘inducing a breach of contract’.1 The language of each of these forms 
of liability seems to imply that they focus on different types of involvement. For example, 
assistance is not necessarily synonymous with inducement. This has resulted in ‘pockets’ of 
third party liability, whereby there are separate formulations of third party liability depending 
on the primary wrong (a crime or a breach of duty committed by another person).2 Nonetheless, 
it has been suggested by a number of commentators that it is possible to draw together claims 
against those who involve themselves with primary wrongs under the concept of ‘accessory 
liability’.3 Paul Davies’ book, Accessory Liability, provides a welcome analysis which seeks to 
provide coherence to ‘accessory liability’ by demonstrating that a unified approach can be used 
to determine the way in which such cases are treated.  
Whether or not one agrees that it is possible to unify the pockets of accessory liability, 
it is worth stating that Davies’ book is a thoroughly researched and insightful publication. This 
book presents a challenging, and powerful, argument that the various forms of accessory 
liability can be drawn together, and Davies’ framework provides a clear way towards achieving 
that goal. In this review, the major point of divergence with Davies’ proposition is that the 
inclusion of the equitable action for dishonest assistance creates a number of problems for this 
general concept of accessory liability. Although the mere historical divide between the courts 
of equity and common law does not justify differentiating between the forms of third party 
liability found in both sources of law, there remain important distinctions in the underlying 
aims and goals in equity from those at common law. It is tentatively suggested in this essay 
that the reason for the distinct nature of third party liability in equity reflects the nature of 
equitable duties. The defining nature of an equitable obligation is the control that a trustee or 
fiduciary has over the interests of another.4 This element of control is important in determining 
the position of third parties for two reasons. One reason is that that the beneficiary or principal 
is in a vulnerable position because of the delegation of control given to the duty holder, and so 
there is a need to prevent third parties from taking advantage of these relationships even where 
their actions assist, rather than cause, breaches of equitable duties.5 The other reason is that the 
trustee or fiduciary’s ability to engage third parties, which is inherent in the control afforded to 
                                                          
1 For dishonest assistance, see Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC) 384-385 (Lord 
Nicholls); for inducing breach of contract, see OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 [39]-[44] 
(Lord Hoffmann). 
2 P. S. Davies, Accessory Liability (Oxford: Hart, 2015) 1-2. 
3 P. Sales, ‘The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability’ 49 CLJ (1990) 491; C. Harpum, ‘The Uses 
and Abuses of Constructive Trusts: The Experience of England and Wales’ 1 Edinburgh L Rev (1997) 437, 462; 
J. Dietrich, ‘The Liability of Accessories under Statute, in Equity, and in Criminal Law: Some Common 
Problems and (Perhaps) Common Solutions’ [2010] 34 Melb U L Rev 106. 
4 J. Getzler, ‘Ascribing and Limiting Fiduciary Obligations’ in A.S. Gold and P.B. Miller (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 43. 
5 H. Carty, ‘Joint Tortfeasance and Assistance Liability’ (1999) 19 Legal Studies 489, 511-512. 
  
those who hold such positions, would be undermined if third parties were exposed to potential 
liability for involvement in wrongdoing by others.6  
These aims are reflected in the way in which equity formulates claims against those 
who assist in breaches of equitable duties. First, equity requires a high level of moral 
culpability, which justifies liability even for ‘weaker’ causal links with the primary wrong such 
as omissions.7 It is even possible for a third party to be held liable in cases where no causal link 
is evident, such as where assistance is provided after a breach of duty has occurred.8 In contrast, 
under the tort of inducing a breach of contract, a strong causal link must be demonstrated 
through the ‘inducement’ of the primary wrongdoer.9 Second, by only imposing liability on 
third parties for high levels of moral culpability, this provides an important level of protection 
for third parties. For example, the mental element required in equity for a third party who assists 
a breach of an equitable duty is one of dishonesty. Thus, equity’s approach to third party 
liability is quite distinct from the approach taken in other instances, such as inducing a breach 
of contract where a less stringent mental element is required.10 Given these differences in 
approach, the incorporation of dishonest assistance would not only require drastic changes to 
the way in which claims outside of equity operate but it also potentially undermines the 
cohesion of the core concept of accessory liability developed in Davies’ book. Moreover, it 
illustrates the importance of recognising the different aims and principles of equity and 
common law. 
 
THE SCOPE OF THE BOOK 
 
‘Accessory liability’ does not include all instances of third party liability and so it will be useful 
at this stage to clarify the use of the term ‘third party liability’ in this essay. The term ‘third 
party’ is commonly used in two situations. The first use of the phrase ‘third party’ may refer to 
any party who is neither a claimant nor a defendant in litigation, but who has nonetheless played 
a significant role in the requirements for a claim.11 An example would be the ‘intervening act’ 
of a ‘third party’.12 The second use of the term ‘third party’ arises when referring to someone 
who is external to a legal relationship and who may potentially be liable for interfering with 
the rights of the claimant. For example, upon its establishment, a trust involves a legal 
relationship between trustee and beneficiary and anyone outside of that relationship stands as 
a third party.13 Similarly, in the law of contract, a third party does not owe the same contractual 
obligations as the contracting parties (167-168). In this essay, the term third party is used in the 
                                                          
6 Barnes v Addy (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 244 (CA) 252 (Selborne LC). 
7 See M. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics (Oxford: OUP, 
2009) 139. Moore also contends that an omission should not be regarded as a ‘cause’, 139-140. 
8 It has been argued by Dietrich that assistance merely provides a ‘weak’ causal link, see J. Dietrich, 
‘Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 231, 242-244. 
9 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 (HL) 121 (Lord Herschell) and Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 (HL) 510 (Lord 
Macnaghten). 
10 See Lord Millett’s dissenting judgment in Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164, [126]-
[134]. 
11 Eg C. McIvor, Third Party Liability in Tort (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 
12 Eg the actions of the police inspector in Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 349 (CA). 
13 Except where there may be a trustee de son tort; Barnes v Addy (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 244 (CA), 251-252. 
Where this happens, the third party loses their status as a third party and instead is treated as a primary duty 
holder. 
  
latter sense by referring to a third party who is someone that is external to an existing legal 
relationship.  
There are also various means by which a third party may be liable for interfering with 
the rights of the claimant, but which nonetheless fall outside of the scope of Davies’ 
formulation of accessory liability. For example, a claimant may be injured because of a breach 
of duty by a primary wrongdoer, but at the same time, the wrongdoer’s employer might also 
be held responsible under the doctrine of vicarious liability.14 According to Davies, we would 
distinguish this type of liability as the third party is strictly liable (58-60). Another example is 
where a defendant has a duty to prevent a third party from causing harm to the claimant but 
fails in performing their duty. One such case is Home Office v Dorset Yacht, where the 
defendants were liable for allowing the escape of the young offenders who damaged the 
claimant’s property.15 This is distinguished from accessory liability on the basis that the 
defendant owed a free standing duty independent of the defendant’s wrongdoing. For example, 
in the Dorset Yacht case, the Home Office was potentially liable even if the young offenders 
had acted in a way that was not regarded as a primary wrong. Davies argues that, therefore, it 
is essential to keep strict liability regimes and free-standing forms of liability separate from 
accessory liability (56-60). The result is liability that is ‘accessorial’; it is contingent upon a 
primary wrong committed by another person, as where a breach of trust or breach of contract 
occurs. 
 
THE CENTRAL APPROACH 
 
In developing accessory liability, Davies sets out a general approach that draws upon principles 
of accessory liability in the criminal context. The analysis breaks down accessory liability into 
a conduct element and a mental element. Both of these elements will be explored in the 
following sections but, for present purposes, it will be useful to briefly set these out. First, the 
conduct element focuses on whether the defendant can be held responsible where their actions 
have made a substantial causal impact on a primary wrong (as where a defendant induces a 
breach of contract) (37-39). Second, the mental element requires the defendant to have 
knowledge that their conduct will ‘constitute causative participation in the type of primary 
wrong actually committed’ (43). Accessory liability requires a claimant to establish both 
elements which, according to Davies, provides a satisfactory means of preventing claims 
against those who may inadvertently become involved in the wrongs of others (13). 
Importantly, Davies’ book firmly pins itself to a fusionist position by seeking to draw together 
claims developed in equity and common law (8-10).16 
 
The Conduct Element 
 
For the purposes of developing the conduct element, Davies explores the terms aid, abet, 
counsel or procure. It is evident from this analysis that there is considerable overlap between 
some of these terms (22-31). Furthermore, it is also apparent that the terms aid, abet, counsel 
                                                          
14 Eg Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 AC 366. 
15 [1970] AC 1004 (HL), discussed by Davies, above n 2, 57. 
16 This is also evident when Davies approves of the fusionist approach to receipt-based liability, n 2 above, 91-
92. 
  
or procure are not always coterminous with the concept of accessory liability developed in the 
book. It is concluded by Davies that the use of these terms creates the potential for confusion 
and conflict; however, the recurrent theme that underpins these conduct elements is that there 
is a link between the act of the defendant and the primary wrong (31). Davies goes on to argue 
that the conduct element can be addressed by asking whether the third party’s activities have 
had a ‘substantial causal impact upon the primary wrong and the infringement of victim’s 
rights’ (39). Although Davies contends that this broad test of ‘substantial cause’ can be applied 
across the board, the book also addresses the conduct question in separate chapters on equity, 
contract and tort.  
Nonetheless, causation is a notoriously complex and controversial issue, and this 
complexity is bound to be exacerbated by the variances in terminology in the criminal context 
as well as its various applications in private law. For example, whilst the terminology of 
‘substantial cause’ will be familiar for criminal lawyers, it may possibly cause some confusion 
for private lawyers.17 Substantial cause indicates that there must be more than a minimal 
contribution, which would indicate that it is akin to ‘material contribution’ to injury in the tort 
of negligence. There are two reasons why the concepts are distinct. First, whereas material 
contribution to injury is essentially a test of factual causation in negligence,18 substantial cause 
appears to incorporate questions of factual and legal causation.19 Second, in cases of material 
contribution to injury, the defendant’s actions must have made some contribution to the overall 
extent of the harm suffered by the claimant.20 But the test of substantial cause adopted by 
Davies can include cases where the contribution of the defendant may have little impact on the 
primary wrong.21 Take for example a trustee who has transferred trust property into their bank 
account in breach of their equitable duty, and afterwards a third party assists in transferring the 
money through a series of bank accounts to prevent the beneficiary from recovering the 
property.22 Since the primary wrong had already been committed before any assistance, it is 
difficult to find a clear causal link between the assistance and the primary wrong.23 It can be 
questioned, therefore, whether such involvement can even be regarded as a ‘substantial’ 
cause.24 For these reasons, it has been contended elsewhere that the question of causation is 
inappropriate for accessory liability, as in many instances the primary wrong would have 
occurred regardless of the accessory’s contribution.25 Dietrich and Ridge, for example, have 
recently contended that ‘the courts have rarely concerned themselves with questions of 
causation in any accessorial context’.26 These authors prefer the terminology of ‘involvement’ 
in the primary wrong. The issue, it is contended here, reflects one of the many difficulties of 
                                                          
17 As noted by K. Burns et al, ‘Australia: A Land of Plenty (of Legislative Legimes)’ in M. Dyson (ed), 
Comparing Tort and Crime: Learning from across and within Legal Systems (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 389-390. 
18 Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016] UKPC 4, [2016] AC 888, [47] (Lord Toulson). 
19 R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56, [2013] 1 WLR 2461 [22]-[23] (Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson). Tort lawyers 
generally take the view that these issues need to be analysed separately; J. Stapleton, ‘Cause in Fact and the 
Scope of Liability for Consequences’ (2003) 119 LQR 388; M. A. Jones, A. M. Dugdale and M. Simpson (eds), 
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 21st ed, 2014) 2-05. 
20 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 (HL), 621 (Lord Reid).  
21 In line with the position adopted in this review, such cases only arise in equity in the context of private law. 
Similar examples exist in criminal law, but the lessons from equity provide the basis for recognising that the 
aims and goals of private law and criminal law are too distinct to be harmonised under a single approach. 
22 A similar example is provided in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164, [107] (Lord 
Millett). This is discussed further below at text to n 39.  
23 J. Dietrich and P. Ridge, Accessories in Private Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 39-40. 
24 Stapleton’s terminology of ‘unnecessary’ cause may be more appropriate; J. Stapleton, ‘Unnecessary Causes’ 
(2013) 129 LQR 39. Also, J. Edelman, ‘Unnecessary Causation’ (2015) 89 Australian Law Journal 20, where it 
is contended that such links should not be regarded as ‘causes’. 
25 Dietrich, above n 8, 242-244. 
26 Dietrich and Ridge, above n 23, 39. 
  
trying to subsume equity’s approach to third party liability under a generic concept of accessory 
liability. It is explained further on that it is not essential for there to be a causal link between a 
third party’s assistance and the breach of an equitable duty as ‘involvement’ is sufficient,27 but 
a requirement of a causal link is more in line with private law claims against third parties for 
breaches in contract and tort.  
 
The Mental Element 
 
In addition to the conduct element, accessory liability also requires a mental element. Davies 
considers whether the mental element should be based on intention, knowledge, dishonesty, 
unconscionability, recklessness or negligence (41-52). Intention is rejected for being too rigid 
and for not capturing all of those scenarios where a defendant should be held responsible (41). 
Those who assist in a primary wrong may be motivated by personal gain, and the harm suffered 
by the claimant may not be the sole purpose for their actions. There have been some attempts 
to define intention in a way that would include ancillary purposes, but such attempts have not 
been entirely convincing.28 Davies’ position would help to avoid this artificiality. It is also 
explained in the book that negligence is not a sufficient mental element for third party liability 
as it would provide an unfair burden on the third party’s freedom of action (52). However, it 
seems that recklessness may be sufficient in establishing that the defendant had the requisite 
levels of actual knowledge (51-53). Actual knowledge is the standard adopted by Davies for 
all forms of accessory liability which, when coupled with the conduct element, seems to 
provide an appropriate regime for capturing most forms of non-equitable accessory liability. 
Davies also rejects dishonesty, for being uncertain in its application and providing an 
unnecessary gloss to the requirement of ‘knowledge’ (49-50). The consequence of this analysis 
is that Davies would also seek a return to knowledge as the mental element in place of 
‘dishonest assistance’ in equity (130). As will be discussed further below,29 the position taken 
in this essay is that a requirement of knowledge would provide insufficient protection for third 
parties, and so dishonesty should be retained as the relevant standard for assistance claims in 
equity. 
 
Defences 
 
The book also argues that it is possible for a knowing accessory to escape liability on the basis 
of justification, a widely defined defence that allows flexibility and further protection for 
parties who should not be held responsible. Such justifications include acting under an equal 
or superior right, performance of a duty, staple article of commerce, public morals and statutory 
justification (230-250). The justification of ‘performance of a duty’ will be of central 
importance when considering dishonest assistance. It will be explained further on that one of 
the most compelling reasons for requiring a stringent mental element in dishonest assistance is 
to protect banks, solicitors and agents who may be acting under the instructions of a primary 
wrongdoer.30 In effect, Davies’ approach would transfer this issue from the grounds of liability 
                                                          
27 See text to n 37 below. 
28 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [42]-[43] (Lord Hoffmann) and [191] (Baroness Hale). 
29 See text to n 86 below. 
30 See text following n 83 below.  
  
to a question of whether there should be a defence. There is a strong reason for being wary of 
this proposition, as this would place the burden of proving ‘justification’ on the third party. A 
similar shift of the burden of proof has been discussed extensively in the context of knowing 
receipt, and academics such as Smith have stressed that in practice this would have a profound 
impact in how parties approach legal proceedings.31 This concern has long been noted in equity, 
as evidenced by Stuart VC in Morgan v Stephens: ‘[t]he necessities of mankind require that the 
fullest protection should be afforded to the character of agent, and to that protection he is 
entitled by the principles of this Court’.32 The tenor of this statement should make us wary of 
placing the burden of justification on a third party who has been involved in a breach of 
equitable duty. 
 
Theorising about Accessory Liability 
 
The most notable aspect of this book is that Davies purposely avoids providing a single theory 
of accessory liability. Whilst a number of principles are considered as the basis for accessory 
liability, it is concluded that ‘[n]o single principle appears to be conclusive’ (20). Instead, 
Davies contends that accessory liability is an amalgamation of responsibility for losses, the 
protection of rights, deterrence and culpability (20-21). It is understandable why Davies has 
not adopted a single unifying theory. Given the current ‘pockets’ of accessory liability that 
exist in English private law, the primary task of this book is to demonstrate that there is 
sufficient commonality between the various strands of accessory liability for them to be unified 
in the first place. Other authors have taken a similar approach to such tasks. For example, in 
his highly influential book, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Birks avoided pinning 
the concept of unjust enrichment on a single principle.33 Just as with the law of unjust 
enrichment, this means that the contours and shapes of Davies’ account of accessory liability 
can provide an essential starting point for others to explore the theoretical basis in the future.34  
At the same time, just as Birks himself conceded in his later writings, there is always 
the potential that too much terrain has been included in the map.35 The consequence of 
including too much terrain is that this may serve to undermine the coherence of the concept of 
accessory liability. This is why a core principle would be preferable. The identification of a 
core principle does not preclude the relevance of the other principles noted by Davies, but it 
allows the boundaries and scope of the concept to be shaped by reference to the underlying 
principle. If, for example, liability is primarily based on the importance of the defendant’s role 
in the primary wrong, it may be necessary to be more restrictive in the causal inquiry by 
excluding cases where the harm would have happened regardless of the conduct of the 
                                                          
31 L. Smith ‘Unjust Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trust’ (2000) 116 Law Q Rev 412, 434 and C. 
Harpum ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark: Some Reflections’ in W.R. Cornish et al (eds) 
Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 250. 
32 Morgan v Stephens (1861) 3 Giff 226, 236 (Stuart VC). 
33 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon, rvd ed, 1989); Birks advocated a 
‘generic conception’ of unjust enrichment, 16, further stating that ‘[t]he best policy is to make no use of the so-
called principle against unjust enrichment’, 25. See also the rejection of a ‘general doctrine’, 27. 
34 Eg E. Weinrib, ‘The Normative Structure of Unjust Enrichment’ in C. Rickett and R. Grantham, Structure 
and Justification in Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 23.  
35 P. Birks, 'Misnomer' in W.R. Cornish et al (eds), above n 31, 7 and fn 15. 
  
accessory.36 On the other hand, if the focus is on culpability, then a stronger mental element, 
such as dishonesty may be required. It also means that, in establishing liability, less focus 
should be placed on establishing a causal link between the third party’s involvement and the 
primary wrong. These differences, it is argued, are indeed evident when we compare dishonest 
assistance in equity with other instances of ‘accessory liability’ developed in Davies’ book, as 
will be demonstrated in the following section. 
 
DISHONEST ASSISTANCE IN EQUITY 
 
There are two key features which distinguish dishonest assistance from Davies’ formulation 
‘accessory liability’. First, in equity, the conduct element is wider than in other instances of 
‘accessory liability’, allowing for liability to arise even in the absence of a causal link. Second, 
the mental element in dishonest assistance is more stringent than in other instances of 
‘accessory liability’.  
 
The Conduct Element; Causation 
 
A strong causal link between the actions of the defendant and the primary wrong is of 
fundamental importance in the context of many forms of third party liability, but less so in 
dishonest assistance.37 Two examples can be given. The first example is that a third party may 
dishonestly assist a breach of trust after the primary wrong has occurred.38 As Lord Millett 
noted in Twinsectra v Yardley, ‘[m]ost of the cases have been concerned, not with assisting in 
the original breach, but in covering it up afterwards by helping to launder the money’.39 It does 
not seem possible, however, for a third party to be liable under the tort of inducing a breach of 
contract where the breach occurred before the third party’s involvement.40 The same is true in 
other situations, such as liability for assisting in a breach of copyright,41 or even for assisting 
in fraud.42 A possible refinement would be to argue that the actions of the third party must be 
causally linked with any losses suffered, rather than necessarily with the committal of the 
primary wrong. But even that analysis is difficult to support in light of judicial statements to 
the contrary,43 and also because a third party can be liable for dishonest assistance even in the 
                                                          
36 See J. Dietrich, ‘Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts’ (2011) 31 LS 231, 241-242 (Dietrich adopts the 
view that liability is a response to the accessory’s responsibility for the legal injury suffered by the claimant, 
231.) 
37 See R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 282. 
38 Eg Glen Dimplex Ltd v Smith [2011] EWHC 3392 (Comm). 
39 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164, [107] (Lord Millett). 
40 There is obiter support for a tort of ‘aiding’ a breach of contract; Hemingway Securities Ltd v Dunraven Ltd 
(1996) 71 P & CR 30 (Jacob J), but formulations of the tort are normally worded in such a way that would 
preclude liability arising. Eg ‘those acts by the father can only be complained of by the plaintiffs as against the 
sons if the sons procured breaches of covenant by the father’, Batts Combe Quarry Ltd v Ford [1942] 2 All ER 
639 (CA) 640 (Lord Greene MR). Also, Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1995] Ch 152 
(CA), 170 (Beldam LJ). 
41 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc [1988] AC 1013 (HL), 1058 (Lord Templeman). 
42 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v Export Credits Guarantee Dept [2000] 1 AC 486 (HL), 499-500 (Lord 
Woolf MR). 
43 Grupo Torras v Al Sabah (2nd November 2000, CA); Casio Computer Co Ltd v Sayo [2001] EWCA Civ 661 
(Tuckey LJ). 
  
absence of any loss.44 Equity’s approach to the conduct element is clearly distinct from the 
approach taken in other instances of ‘accessory liability’. As noted above, this can be attributed 
to the fact that equity has traditionally focused more on the mental element by requiring 
dishonest involvement.45 By focusing more on moral culpability and less on the responsibility 
of the third party, a more general question of ‘assistance’ in the breach of an equitable duty is 
appropriate as opposed to the narrower causal enquiry used elsewhere in private law.  
 
The Conduct Element; Omissions 
 
The second example concerns omissions. Notably, Davies does not seek to distinguish between 
cases of passive and active interference (23-24). This is inevitable if one is seeking to develop 
a regime that can incorporate accessory liability in equity where omissions liability seems to 
have been accepted by the judiciary. An example given in Davies’ book derives from Lord 
Nicholls in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan, where his Lordship discussed the liability of a solicitor 
who fails to tell a trustee that a particular act constitutes a breach of trust.46 This position would 
also appear to be supported by a comment made by Lord Walker in Customs & Excise v 
Barclays Bank.47 In Customs & Excise, the question was whether a bank could owe a duty of 
care to prevent a customer from withdrawing funds from an account which had been the subject 
of a freezing injunction. Although the claim failed, Lord Walker also noted that a bank would 
be liable ‘for breach of fiduciary duty if they shut their eyes to dishonest dealings by their 
customers’.48 Admittedly, the language used here is not very helpful. If the money channelled 
through a bank account is trust money, the bank would not necessarily have owed any fiduciary 
duties to anyone. They certainly do not owe a fiduciary duty to their customers,49 and it would 
be controversial to conclude that they owe fiduciary duties merely on the basis that they know 
the money is the subject of a trust.50 The sensible conclusion is that Lord Walker was, 
essentially, discussing dishonest assistance here. It has been argued by other commentators 
that, where a bank is aware that trust money is being paid into a bank account, the bank will be 
actively assisting the breach through the provision of the bank account.51 However, that would 
require blurring the lines between positive acts and omissions. It would be preferable to 
acknowledge that the failure to prevent a breach of trust by the bank constitutes an omission. 
The imposition of assistance liability in cases of omissions is further supported by Glen 
Dimplex Home Appliances Ltd v Smith, where it was concluded that the defendant who had 
allowed his wife to use their joint bank account as a vehicle for fraud was guilty of dishonest 
assistance.52  
                                                          
44 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] EWCA Civ 908; [2015] QB 499. 
45 See text to n 10 above. 
46 Royal Brunei n 1, 384. 
47 [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181. 
48 ibid, [75]. Also, Jones v Churcher [2009] EWHC 722 (QB), [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep 94. 
49 Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HL Cas 28, and Wilson v Lord Bury (1880) 5 QBD 518 (CA), 531(Brett LJ); ‘the 
relation of banker and customer, which is contract, and not trust’ although it was indicated in Bank of Scotland v 
A Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 52 [2001] 1 WLR 751, that a bank could become a ‘putative fiduciary’ [37] (Lord 
Woolf CJ). 
50 Eg the reception of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s suggestion that mere knowledge can create a fiduciary duty in 
Westdeutsche v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) at 708-709; P. Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust 
Enrichment’ (1996) 4 RLR 1, 19–20 and R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford: OUP, 1997) 208. 
51 E.P. Ellinger et al, Ellinger's Modern Banking Law, (Oxford: OUP, 5th ed, 2011) 279. The authors cite Dodds-
Streeton J in Re-Engine Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fergusson [2007] VSC 57 [117]. 
52 [2011] EWHC 3392 (Comm). 
  
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether omissions can ever lead to liability in other 
areas of private law.53 For example, it is difficult to see how an omission could lead to a 
conclusion that a third party can be liable for inducing, or even aiding, a breach of contract. Let 
us say that B is under contract with C, and A is someone whose opinion B greatly respects. A 
is told by B that B plans to breach his contract with C, but A does not try to dissuade B from 
this course of action. If we are simply asking whether A has knowledge and whether there is a 
causal link, then this is readily satisfied in this scenario. A knew full well what was going to 
happen and that their failure to use their sway over B would result in a breach of contract 
between B and C. Under the current state of law, it would not be possible to bring a claim for 
inducing a breach of contract, and it is questionable whether this would be desirable.54 
Something more ‘substantial’ should be required to hold a third party responsible for another 
person’s breach of contract. Contract could try to follow equity by demanding a more stringent 
mental element, which was suggested by the language of ‘malicious’ interference in Lumley v  
Gye,55 but that has long been rejected as essential.56 This is why, outside of equity, it is not 
only necessary to have a clear causal link but also to demonstrate that the third party’s positive 
actions led to the primary wrong. 
Liability for failing to intervene could also have a profound impact in other areas of tort 
law. For example, there are numerous cases in negligence where the courts have rejected any 
potential liability against the police for failing to act despite having knowledge that a criminal 
was going to attack a victim.57 Another possible example is the aforementioned case of 
Customs & Excise.58 The bank had knowledge that a ‘wrong’ was likely to occur (eg avoiding 
paying tax liability59), but permitting this to happen was not, on its own, sufficient to give rise 
to liability. In negligence, liability for omissions is tightly controlled and the concern would be 
that accessory liability could be used to circumvent these rules unless the conduct element is 
more narrowly defined. For accessory liability to correspond to existing private law principles, 
liability for failing to act should never be sufficient for establishing accessory liability. The 
logical conclusion is, therefore, to recognise that dishonest assistance in equity is a different 
form of third party liability from ‘accessory liability’. An obvious consequence is that the term 
‘accessory’ would no longer seem appropriate, and it may be preferable to label this liability 
for ‘knowing inducement’ (although for the purposes of this essay, it will continue to be 
referred to as ‘accessory liability’). 
 
The Mental Element 
 
One of the significant changes that would be provided by the adoption of knowledge as the 
mental element is that it would require the courts to move away from dishonesty as a standard 
                                                          
53 See Dietrich and Ridge, n 23 above, 123.  
54 H. Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (OUP: Oxford, 2nd ed, 2010), 46-47 and Dietrich and Ridge, 
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55 (1853) 2 El & Bl 216. 
56 See the cases mentioned at n 9 above and also Davies n 2 above 156-157.  
57 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732; Van Colle v Chief Constable of 
the Hertfordshire Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] AC 225; Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, 
[2009] AC 874; Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344 (CA). 
58 [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181. 
59 It is unclear whether this can be regarded as a ‘tort’; see Total Network SL v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 [121]-[122] (Lord Mance). In any case, it would be a 
criminal wrong; R v Hudson [1956] 2 QB 252 (CA). 
  
in equity. An interesting point that Davies raises is that dishonesty is not required for accessory 
liability in the criminal context which makes its application in equity, at first glance, somewhat 
surprising (119-120). Davies is also correct in asserting that ‘dishonesty’ has caused difficulty 
in determining the liability of accessories in equity. Whereas the Privy Council in Royal Brunei 
v Tan seemingly recognised an objective standard of dishonesty,60 in Twinsectra v Yardley the 
majority introduced an additional subjective limb that required the defendant to realise that 
they were also dishonest by the standards of others.61 The additional limb in Twinsectra made 
it more difficult to establish that a defendant was dishonest, in essence providing an extra level 
of protection for the defendant. Although the Privy Council sought to restate the Royal Brunei 
position in Barlow Clowes Intl Ltd v Eurotrust Intl Ltd,62 as Davies notes, this required a 
reinterpretation of Twinsectra that seemed to conflict with the judgments in that decision (117-
118). Lower courts have been left in the unenviable position of applying the Privy Council’s 
difficult reinterpretation of a House of Lords judgment, as demonstrated by Abou-Rahmah v 
Abacha.63 In Abou-Rahmah, Arden LJ followed the Royal Brunei test, whereas Pill LJ seemed 
to acknowledge the Twinsectra test and Rix LJ refused to commit to either position.64 A 
possible reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the finding of dishonesty could have 
severe repercussions for those who work in the legal profession, which may provide the real 
reason for the conflicting versions of the test for dishonesty that has been present in equity 
(119).65 Notably, the Twinsectra test has been consistently applied in disciplinary proceedings 
against solicitors,66 whereas the Royal test has been applied in other contexts.67 It would be an 
understatement to call the resulting state of law unsatisfactory.  
There is, therefore, appeal in Davies’ proposition that knowledge, coupled with 
substantial cause, would provide a more suitable test for third party liability. But it is debatable 
whether the current state of dishonest assistance requires such a wholesale change, especially 
since the adoption of knowledge could potentially cause as much confusion as the current test 
for dishonesty. For example, the precise meaning of ‘knowledge’ in the context of knowing 
receipt has attracted its own share of criticism.68 Moreover, the uncertainty involved in the 
appropriate test for dishonesty might possibly be resolved by focusing on the established 
patterns of liability in equity. Indeed, if one looks at the case of Bodenham v Hoskyns, which 
has unfortunately not been cited in any of the above authorities, it is evident that the test should 
clearly be defined as an objective standard.69 In Bodenham, Kindersley VC was even careful 
to conclude that the defendant had not been guilty of ‘any design of doing that which in their 
minds was dishonest or improper’ but had nonetheless fallen below the standards imposed by 
the courts of equity.70 It may not be the essence of the test which is the problem, but rather the 
need for alternative term to ‘dishonesty’. For example, the phrase of ‘want of probity’ appears 
                                                          
60 Royal Brunei, above n 1, 389 (Lord Nicholls). 
61 Twinsectra, above n 22, [36] (Lord Hutton). 
62 [2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1 WLR 1476. 
63 [2006] EWCA Civ 1492, [2007] Bus LR 220. 
64 ibid, [59a] (Arden LJ), [93]-[94] (Pill LJ), [23] (Rix LJ). 
65 Also, Twinsectra, above n 22, [35] (Lord Hutton) and [134] (Lord Millett).  
66 Bultitude v The Law Society [2004] EWCA Civ 1853, [32] (Kennedy LJ); Bryant v The Law Society [2007] 
EWHC 3043, [2009] 1 WLR 163, [148]-[149] and [153] (Richards LJ); Rukhsana Jabeen Kiani v Solicitors' 
Regulation Authority [2015] EWHC 1981 (Admin) [40] (Laing J). 
67 Central Bank of Ecuador v Conticorp SA [2015] UKPC 11 [9] (Lord Mance). 
68 Eg Lord Nicholls, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark’ in W.R. Cornish et al, n 31 above, 231. 
69 (1852) 21 LJ Ch 864, [1843-60] All ER Rep 692, affd (1852) 2 De G M & G 903. 
70 ibid, 697 (Kindersely VC). 
  
to be synonymous with dishonesty in this context,71 and may be preferable as a less ‘loaded’ 
term.  
 
The Relationship between Assistance Liability and Knowing Receipt 
 
The reformulation of ‘dishonest assistance’ to ‘knowing assistance’ would also seemingly 
harmonise the mental element for knowing receipt and accessory liability. However, this is 
something that Davies is keen to avoid. Davies contends that the test of unconscionability in 
knowing receipt makes this distinct from the mental element of knowledge that he is advocating 
for accessory liability (115). There are three reasons why this author would take a different 
interpretation of the relationship between these concepts. First, it is questionable whether it was 
intended for there to be a distinction between knowledge and conscience. Although some 
commentators have taken the position that the test for ‘knowing receipt’ is now one for 
unconscionable receipt,72 unconscionability was adopted as the test for identifying the requisite 
knowledge, not to replace the requirement altogether.73 Furthermore, before the test for 
unconscionability was adopted, the most contentious issue concerned the degree of knowledge 
required, such as whether constructive knowledge or recklessness could be sufficient. As Birks 
noted, the term unconscionability appears as if it ‘embraces every position in the 
controversy’.74 For this reason, despite the adoption of unconscionability, the current state of 
knowing receipt may nonetheless involve the same mental element as a reformulated action for 
‘knowing assistance’.75  
The second reason why the reformulation of dishonest assistance would seemingly 
bring it closer to knowing receipt is that both are fault-based claims. In seeking to distinguish 
a reformulated test for ‘knowing assistance’ from ‘knowing receipt’, Davies argues that the 
liability of a third party recipient of trust property is ‘passive’ (91). But, as it currently stands, 
the ‘conduct element’ is not merely satisfied by receipt.76 Let us say that a defendant receives 
£10,000 in cash and a week later they are notified that the money belongs in equity to the 
claimant. Before the money can be transferred back to the claimant, the money is stolen from 
the defendant.77 In such circumstances, it would not be appropriate to hold the recipient 
responsible for this loss.78 This is why the test requires unconscionable receipt; the test of 
conscience is not merely an assessment of the mental element, but also the conduct element.79 
                                                          
71 Starglade Properties Ltd v Roland Nash [2010] EWCA Civ 1314 [24] (Hughes LJ); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v 
Herbert Smith & Co (No 2) [1969] 2 Ch 276 (CA) 
72 Eg G. Virgo, Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford: OUP, 3rd ed, 2015) 645. 
73 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437 (CA), 455 (Nourse LJ). 
74 P. Birks ‘Receipt’ in P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds) Breach of Trust (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 226. 
75 Eg M. Bryan, ‘Cleaning up After Breaches of Fiduciary Duty - The Liability of Banks and Other Financial 
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personal liability for knowing receipt. 
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Morley v Morley (1678) 2 Ch Cas 2, Jones v Lewis (1751) 2 Ves Sen 240 and Re Munton [1927] 1 Ch 262 (CA).  
78 Although the claim concerned one for dishonest assistance, Tomlinson J’s discussion in Fitzalan-Howard v 
Hibbert [2009] EWHC 2855 (QB) at [49]-[50] demonstrates that conscience is only affected at ‘the point at 
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79 In Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch), [2013] Ch 156 at [277]-[286], 
Morris QC placed significance on the fact that the defendants had ‘behaved in a “commercially unacceptable” 
  
Davies seeks to further distinguish knowing receipt by noting that arguments have been made 
for the availability of unjust enrichment against third party recipients of trust property (92, fn 
29). Under the unjust enrichment analysis, the recipient’s liability would be strict and does not 
require knowledge. But even the strongest advocates of unjust enrichment have now conceded 
that unjust enrichment would co-exist alongside knowing receipt, not replace it altogether.80 
Therefore, the adoption of unjust enrichment, which itself is highly controversial, does not 
avoid the issue that Davies’ proposition would inevitably bring ‘dishonest assistance’ closer to 
knowing receipt.  
The third reason for the position adopted here is that a more stringent mental 
requirement has always been applied to those who assist in breaches of equitable duties in 
comparison to those who knowingly received trust property. In many cases of ‘dishonest 
assistance’, a third party would receive trust property but the courts consistently drew a 
distinction between cases where the third party was receiving property on behalf of the trustee 
as opposed to where they received it for their own purposes.81 In modern times, this distinction 
is recognised under the concept of ‘ministerial receipt’.82 Regardless of the terminology, where 
a third party was receiving property under the instructions of the trustee, it would be the trustee 
to whom the third party owed obligations.83 Such defendants have traditionally been a solicitor, 
agent or bank who was acting on the instructions of a fiduciary or trustee.84 Third party liability 
was always strictly controlled and it was in these cases where the more stringent mental element 
of dishonesty emerged, otherwise the third party would be subject to potentially conflicting 
duties. Therefore, the ability of a trustee or fiduciary to engage others on behalf of the claimant 
provides strong support for equity’s stringent mental element.85 This is because it would be too 
burdensome to impose competing duties on the third party unless it is evident that they are 
acting dishonestly.86 For example, in Gray v Johnston, Cairns LC stated ‘it would be a most 
serious matter if bankers were to be allowed, on light and trifling grounds—on grounds of mere 
suspicion or curiosity—to refuse to honour a cheque drawn by their customer’.87 Similar 
reasoning is apparent in cases of agents such as Lockwood v Abdy, where it was stated that it 
would be ‘a most fearful thing’ if a sub-agent owed duties directly towards a beneficiary, but 
that the court would interfere where the agent was guilty of a corrupt abuse of power.88  
                                                          
manner’. Similarly, Arthur v Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands [2012] UKPC 30 at [36]-[37] 
(Sir Terence Etherton). It is also notable that Lord Walker in Yeoman’s Rowe Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008] 
UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752 at [92] argued that unconscionability ‘should always be used [] as an objective 
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80 See Lord Nicholls, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark’ in WR Cornish et al, n 31 above, 231 
and Birks, above n 74, 213. According to A. Burrows, unjust enrichment and knowing receipt ‘can happily co-
exist’ in The Law of Restitution (Oxford: OUP, 3rd ed, 2010), 431.  
81 Eg Davis v Spurling (1829) 1 Russ & M 64, 66 (Sir John Leach). See also S. Barkehall Thomas, ‘Knowing 
Receipt and Knowing Assistance: Where Do We Stand?’ (1997) 20 The University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 1, 2-3. 
82 Jones v Churcher [2009] EWHC 722 (QB), [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep 94 [66]-[78] (Havelock-Allan QC). 
83 Re Barney [1892] 2 Ch 265; Mara v Browne [1896] 1 Ch 199 (CA). 
84 As noted by S. Gardner, ‘Knowing Assistance and Knowing Receipt: Taking Stock’ (1996) 112 LQR 56, 92. 
85 See the justification for the rules on third party liability in Barnes v Addy (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 244 (CA), 
252 (Selborne LC). 
86 See C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 8th ed, 2011) 28-04. 
87 (1868) LR 3 HL 1, 12. Also, Hartga v The Bank of England (1796) 3 Ves Jr 55, 58 (Loughborough LC). 
88 (1845) 14 Sim 437, 441 (Shadwell VC). This rule is well established; in Myler v Fitzpatrick (1822) 6 Madd 
360, 360 (Sir John Leach) it was stated that ‘[a] mere agent is to account to his principal only’. Also, Nickolson 
v Knowles (1820) 5 Madd 47, cited with approval in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (No 2) [1969] 2 
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This limitation has not just been applied in cases involving suspicions, but also where 
there is knowledge that a primary wrong is being committed. Re Blundell is one such 
example.89 In that case, Stirling J acknowledged that the defendants had knowledge that the 
trustee had committed a breach of trust, but this was not sufficient to hold them liable. This 
decision was a key authority in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (No 2)90 as well as 
Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts,91 and both cases have been important in the development of 
‘dishonesty’ as the required mental element.92 Another instance is Brinsden v Williams, where 
the solicitors were aware that the trustees were making an investment in breach of trust but that 
this alone ‘did not implicate them in a breach of trust’ as they were ‘merely carrying out the 
directions of their principal in the matter’.93 It is, thus, clearly established that mere knowledge 
alone cannot be sufficient to make a third party liable for assisting a breach of equitable duty. 
Furthermore, it would be undesirable if authorities concerning the mental element required in 
equity were to be cited in claims against third parties outside of equity, especially given Davies’ 
(convincing) argument that mere knowledge is sufficient for accessory liability in contract 
(158-160) and tort (206-209).94 
 
LESSONS FROM THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN EQUITY 
 
Important lessons can be drawn from equity’s approach to third party liability. It has been so 
far noted that in equity the focus is on moral culpability as it enables the courts to protect the 
operation of equitable duties. The requirement of dishonesty provides the basis for imposing 
liability on a third party even in the absence of a causal link between a third party’s assistance 
and the primary wrong, whilst at the same time facilitating the trustee or fiduciary’s ability to 
engage with third parties. But where stronger causal links can be found, these justifications for 
the requirement of dishonesty no longer apply. The claim for knowing receipt, discussed in the 
preceding section, provides a clear example where the third party’s actions will have a clear 
causal connection with the loss of trust property. That causal connection will be much stronger 
than the connection between one who assists in a breach, and as a result there is no requirement 
for dishonesty. It is also notable that, in the few cases where a third party has procured a breach 
of trust, the requirement was merely for knowledge rather than dishonesty. For example, in 
Fyler v Fyler it was concluded that the third parties had not acted fraudulently, but liability was 
satisfied by their knowing inducement of a breach of trust.95 Although Lord Nicholls’ 
formulation of dishonest assistance in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan included procuring a breach 
of trust, it is questionable whether ‘dishonesty’ is required where there is a strong causal link 
in the form of actively causing a breach of trust.96 
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Equity has also developed ways of finding third parties liable even where no primary 
wrong occurs, but where a third party has actively taken control over the claimant’s interests. 
Notably, liability under these duties can be established in the absence of dishonesty. This is 
illustrated by the concept of ‘trustee de son tort’ where a third party, who is not initially a 
trustee, takes on the role of acting as a trustee. In such cases, the third party can be held liable 
for knowingly intermeddling in trust affairs.97 A further example is provided by the other form 
of liability explored in Davies’ book, namely breach of confidence. The traditional scope of 
this claim was that liability would be imposed on the basis of a breach of the claimant’s 
property rights or contractual rights.98 In breach of confidence cases, liability has arguably been 
extended to third parties even in the absence of any primary wrong.99 At times, the courts have 
created questionable breaches of primary obligations so as to enable claims against third 
parties; for example, holding that those attending a lecture were parties to an implied contract 
with the lecturer,100 or that information of the stock market was a form of property.101 This 
ability to impose a duty on a third party was more accurately captured in Lord Goff’s judgment 
in the Spycatcher case where his Lordship concluded that a third party who receives 
confidential information would be subject to a free-standing duty of confidence.102  
A final example can be illustrated by considering the liability of banks. As mentioned 
above,103 when a bank receives trust property on behalf of a trustee, the bank is not subject to 
the test for knowing receipt. So long as the bank acts in accordance with the trustee’s 
instructions, they are subject to the test for dishonest assistance. But where the bank would step 
outside of the trustee’s instructions (for example attempting to set-off the credit in the trust 
account with the debit in the trustee’s personal account), the bank would become liable to the 
beneficiaries so long as they knew about the existence of the trust.104 The precise classification 
of such claims is debatable, but it is difficult to see how these claims can be fitted into accessory 
liability as liability does not depend upon a breach of duty by the trustee,105 nor does it easily 
fit within any of the other modern forms of third party liability in equity.106 This reveals an 
important concern, which is that the concept of ‘accessory liability’ could conceal the various 
degrees of ‘involvement’ that a third party can have in interferences with pre-existing equitable 
rights. As a result, the development of a unified concept of accessory liability may unduly 
inhibit the ability of the courts to reach third parties in the absence of primary wrongs or could 
lead to fictitious ‘primary wrongs’. Fraudsters will continually seek to find new ways to benefit 
at the disadvantage of others, and the courts of equity have always strived to adapt to such 
behaviour. This is one of the reasons for equity’s increased role in commercial cases.107 An 
example given by Gardner is where the trustee honestly relied on the probity and competence 
of a third party but where the third party acted dishonestly. In such cases, there would be no 
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breach of trust and, hence, no primary wrong. Gardner contends that the third party should be 
held liable as the defendant ‘has just as much harmed the jural rights comprising the trust as if 
there were a breach’.108 Although Davies argues that common law claims such as negligence 
or deceit may be available, those claims are more limited in scope than those available in 
equity.109 Where a third party is in the position to fully influence the unsuspecting duty holder 
in equity, it would seem to be in line with equity’s approach to hold the third party accountable 
for knowingly interfering with the beneficiary’s rights due to the strong causal link between 
the dishonesty of the third party and the loss of the trust property.  
 
JUSTIFYING EQUITY’S UNIQUE APPROACH 
 
There is certainly a case for harmonising many forms of accessory liability but, arguably, a 
different approach is required where the third party’s acts involve the infringement of equitable 
rights. Davies argues in this book, convincingly for this author, that one should not distinguish 
equity from common law on the basis that the rights are often proprietary in nature (96-100). 
Furthermore, Davies makes a convincing argument that the mere historical distinction of equity 
and common law does not justify continued differences between these two streams of law. But 
even those who support the fusion of both bodies of law acknowledge that some important 
distinctions remain.110 Nonetheless, if equity is to retain its focus on the more stringent mental 
requirement of dishonesty, there needs to be a reason for its unique approach to dishonest 
assisters. It has been suggested here that the unique nature of equitable duties provides 
sufficient justification for recognising that dishonest assistance is a distinct concept from 
‘accessory liability’, despite the familial resemblances between the two concepts. As noted 
earlier,111 equitable duties arise where one party has control over the interests of another and 
which differentiates equitable rights from other rights in private law.112 Equity’s formulation 
of dishonest assistance is important in ensuring the operation of these duties for two reasons.  
The first reason is the need to protect the vulnerability of claimants where a trustee or 
fiduciary has control over their interests.113 To quote one judge, this is reflected in ‘the general 
rule that equity demands higher standards of behaviour than the common law’.114 As it has 
been demonstrated in this essay, a significant benefit which is afforded by equity’s requirement 
of dishonesty is that it justifies liability even in the absence of a causal link between the 
assistance the primary wrong. To quote Moore: ‘we can relax our normal causation requirement 
(from causing to mere aiding) only because of the high level of culpability with which the aider 
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acts’.115 By analogy, equity’s formulation of dishonest assistance is appropriate in relaxing the 
causal requirements where the third party has acted with a high level of culpability. For this 
reason, dishonesty is a preferable mental state as opposed to mere knowledge. But duties 
outside of equity do not involve the same level of vulnerability and therefore they do not require 
the same level of protection. It also seems that the common law courts have sought to avoid 
the difficulties of focusing too much on the defendant’s mental state.116 Therefore, liability 
outside of equity only arises where there is a clear causal link between the actions of the third 
party and the primary wrong. This also means that there is no need for the common law to 
require a high level of moral culpability, which is reflected in the requirement of knowledge. 
The second reason for equity’s requirement of dishonesty is that those who owe 
equitable duties need to have the power to engage with third parties. As Shadwell VC noted in 
Lockwood v Abdy, ‘in cases where gentlemen act as trustees, they must, of necessity, employ 
solicitors, receivers, bankers, and agents of various kinds’.117 The ability to engage third parties 
would be undermined if equity imposed liability on third parties for mere knowing involvement 
in a breach of equitable duty. Indeed, much of the discussion in Barnes v Addy focused heavily 
on the need to protect third parties, as opposed to the need to protect the interests of 
beneficiaries.118 For example, in justifying equity’s approach to the liability of third parties, 
Selborne LC stated that ‘[i[f those principles were disregarded, I know not how any one could, 
in transactions admitting of doubt as to the view which a Court of Equity might take of them, 
safely discharge the office of solicitor, of banker, or of agent of any sort to trustees’.119 Again, 
the approach taken at common law is distinguishable, as legal obligations are more readily 
compartmentalised outside of equity. Since third parties will not be held responsible for mere 
involvement or even for merely assisting breaches of common law duties, responsibility is 
more readily imposed on third parties for positively causing a breach of duty even in the 
absence of dishonesty. Davies’ formulation of accessory liability seems appropriate for such 
instances of liability, but the unique approach taken in equity requires the recognition that 
dishonest assistance is a separate legal concept. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It has been argued that dishonest assistance cannot, and should not, be accommodated within 
Davies’ formulation of accessory liability. It should also be noted, however, that (with some 
possible modifications, such as precluding liability for omissions) Davies has provided a 
compelling case for bringing together a number of hitherto heterogeneous forms of third party 
liability. The importance of bringing together the various strands of accessory liability is 
thoroughly explained not only in the early chapters but also throughout the book. It is worth 
restating that this is an ambitious project which is more than impressive in its accomplishments. 
There will inevitably be areas where other commentators seek to modify elements of the 
concept of accessory liability, and it may be preferable for this to be labelled ‘knowing 
inducement’. Such debate can only serve to strengthen the future development of assistance 
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liability, as for too long these rules have remained disparate and incapable of a wider analysis. 
If the courts were to attempt to unite the various forms of third party liability, the book will 
stand as a key source in guiding the shape of this form of liability. Most importantly, the clarity 
and thoroughness of Davies’ book should reassure the courts that such a task is feasible. 
Although this review has noted some areas of disagreement, the premise of exploring the 
relationship between the disparate forms of third party liable is a more than worthwhile 
endeavour. 
The main source of disagreement for this writer is whether equity can so easily be 
accommodated with other forms of third party liability in private law. It has been argued that 
dishonest assistance does not involve the same conduct element as other forms of third party 
liability which are included in Davies’ book. Liability can arise for ‘weak’ causal links in 
dishonest assistance claims such as where a third party fails to intervene. It is also the case that 
liability can arise for involvement which arises ‘after the event’, which undermines Davies’ 
suggestion that there must be a causal link between a third party’s conduct and a primary 
wrong. Furthermore, it is well established that mere knowledge of involvement in a breach of 
equitable duty is not sufficient and that dishonesty is instead required. Finally, as explained 
above, it is evident that a primary wrong is not always necessary in equity for a third party to 
be regarded as responsible for losses caused to the claimant. Given the ever-creative and new 
forms of fraud, it would be undesirable for the courts to be kept within such a rigid 
straightjacket. For accessory liability to become an established private law concept, it is 
important that it does not try to do too much and also that its acceptance does not lead to 
unforeseeable consequences. In this author’s view, more cohesion would be achieved in the 
concept of accessory liability if equity’s action for dishonest assistance was removed from its 
ambit.  
